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Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and
the ADEA
Consider two employees who are victims of sexual harrass-
ment. The first employee is fired after she refuses to accede to the
repeated sexual demands of her supervisor. The second employee
is also propositioned, but considers the working environment so in-
tolerable that she resigns before any adverse action is taken
against her. Each woman then sues her employer under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Both employers may have violated Title VII. 2 Even so, be-
cause of the way in which their employment was terminated the
two employees may be entitled to different remedies. The first em-
ployee-who was fired-would presumptively be entitled to
backpay for the wages lost after the date of firing.' In contrast, the
' Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
In addition, section 704(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against an employee because the employee has "opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
The first employer might be liable for what is known as "quid pro quo" harassment,
while the second could be liable for the creation of an offensive working environment. See,
e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-02, 908-10 (11th Cir. 1982).
3 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 408, 421-22 (1975).
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second employee-who resigned-would be entitled to backpay
only if her resignation was found to be a "constructive discharge."4
Courts have developed two different tests for determining
when an employee has been constructively discharged by a dis-
criminatory employer. Under the majority view, an employee who
resigns after being subjected to unlawful discrimination is said to
have been constructively discharged if a reasonable person would
have found the discriminatory conditions to be intolerable. Under
the minority view, the plaintiff must show not only that conditions
were intolerable, but also that the employer created those condi-
tions with the specific intent of forcing her to resign.' In the exam-
ple given above, a court taking the majority view might find that
the second employee's decision to resign was reasonable, and
award her backpay.6 A court following the minority view might
agree that the resignation was reasonable, but deny backpay on the
grounds that, far from wanting the employee to quit, the supervi-
sor wanted her to remain on the job and comply with his demands.
Part I of this comment examines these two different tests in
the context of cases decided under both Title VII and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA),7 isolating the situations
4 See, e.g., Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 1981); Muller
v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975);
Rimedio v. Revlon, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1380, 1390 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
Obviously, the actions of the employer that create the intolerable working conditions
and force the employee to resign must violate Title VII or the ADEA before backpay may be
awarded under those statutes. For example, an employee who is harassed because he is over-
weight or because the employer does not like the color of his hair is not entitled to a remedy
under Title VII if he eventually resigns because the harassment has made working condi-
tions intolerable.
Surprisingly, some courts appear to disregard this statutory requirement that the acts
causing the resignation be acts which violate Title VII or the ADEA. In Muller v. United
States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975), for example,
the court concluded that the employer had discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of
Title VII by not promoting him to the position of foreman. The court then examined
whether the employer's independent act of downgrading the plaintiff to a laborer's position
amounted to a constructive discharge-even though it had not yet determined whether this
act, as opposed to the failure to promote him, violated Title VII. The court observed that
the plaintiff was downgraded because of the temporary closing of a mill; but rather than
concluding from this that the employer's act did not violate Title VII, the court concluded
that the act was not designed to coerce the resignation. Id. at 929; see also Johnson v.
Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981) (court concluded, from evidence that the
plaintiff was treated no differently from other employees, that the employer's acts were not
designed to force resignation rather than that the acts did not violate Title VII).
6 See, e.g., Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 651-52 (E.D. Mich.
1982).
7 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as the ADEA].
The ADEA's prohibitions against age discrimination are closely patterned after those of
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in which the two tests will lead to different results. Part II weighs
the merits of the two tests in light of the purposes of Title VII and
the ADEA, and concludes that the reasonable person test better
serves those purposes.
I. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE UNDER TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
A. The Case Law on Constructive Discharge
1. The Reasonable Person Test. The majority approach
holds that an employee has been constructively discharged if an
employer's discriminatory acts result in working conditions so in-
tolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would
feel compelled to resign." This test was first developed in the Fifth
Circuit, although the early constructive discharge cases in that cir-
cuit seemed to place significant weight on the employer's intent.
For instance, in one of the first constructive discharge cases, Young
v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Association,9 the Fifth Circuit
panel recognized that constructive discharge claims could be
brought under Title VII. The court then defined a standard by
stating that "if the employer deliberately makes an employee's
working conditions so intolerable'that the employee is forced into
an involuntary resignation, then the employer has encompassed a
constructive discharge." 10
Some courts cited Young as authority for requiring the plain-
tiff to demonstrate that the employer intended to force her to
quit."" However, the Fifth Circuit backed away from Young's lan-
guage of specific intent in Calcote v. Texas Educational Founda-
tion,12 a case indicating that Young required only that the acts
which created the intolerable conditions-and not the resignation
itself-were intended by the employer. Finally, in Bourque v. Pow-
ell Electrical Manufacturing Co.,"8 the Fifth Circuit dropped all
language of specific intent and explicitly adopted a reasonable per-
son test. It has adhered to that test in a number of subsequent
cases, 1 4 and its approach has been followed by a majority of the
Title VII. See ADEA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982); infra note 92 and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1980).
' 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
10 Id. at 144.
" See, e.g., Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 F.2d 220, 223 (8th Cir. 1977).
12 578 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1978) (the district court's conclusions "should be expanded
to reflect ... that the actions which caused Calcote's working conditions to be intolerable
were deliberate"); see EEOC v. Hay Assocs., 545 F. Supp. 1064, 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
13 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980).
14 See, e.g., Junior v. Texaco, Inc., 688 F.2d 377, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1982) (suit brought
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federal appellate courts that have considered the issue. 5
The courts have not always been clear in their use of this ap-
proach. For example, the Second Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit
step for step by initially adopting the intent-oriented formulation
advanced in Young and then later reversing direction to apply a
reasonable person test.16 The District of Columbia Circuit also has
adopted the Fifth Circuit's approach, but has explained its refusal
to require specific intent on the grounds that an employer "must
be held to have intended those consequences it could reasonably
have foreseen." 1 The Sixth Circuit, however, has straddled this
under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)); Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d
369, 372 (5th Cir. 1981) (Title VII); Welch v. University of Tex., 659 F.2d 531, 533-34 (5th
Cir. 1981) (Title VII); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071,
1077 (5th Cir. 1981) (Title VII).
15 First Circuit: Alicea Rosada v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)
(employee alleged he was constructively discharged for exercising his first amendment right
of free speech); see also Cazzola v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., 751 F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1984)
(court appeared to follow Alicea Rosado in a case decided under the ADEA).
Second Circuit: Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985) (Title VII
and section 1981); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (ADEA);
Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 79 Civ. 1076-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1985) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (ADEA); Garcia v. Forbes Magazine, No. 83 Civ. 3814-
CSH (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (Title VII).
Third Circuit: Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984) (Title
VII).
Sixth Circuit: Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 49 (6th Cir. 1985)
(ADEA); Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 996 (6th Cir. 1984) (Title VII); Held v. Gulf Oil
Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982) (Title VII) (Sixth Circuit is "in accord with the rule in
the Fifth Circuit").
Ninth Circuit: Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (Title VII);
Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812-14 & n.17 (9th Cir. 1982) (Title VII).
Eleventh Circuit: Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 758 F.2d 1525, 1530-31 (11th Cir.
1985) (ADEA); Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 935 (11th Cir.) (Title VII), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 907-08 (11th Cir.
1982) (Title VII).
District of Columbia Circuit: Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-76 & nn.5, 8 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (Title VII).
Although the Seventh Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, several of its district
courts have adopted a reasonable person approach. See Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1333, 1337 (N.D. IM. 1984) (ADEA); Bailey v. Bin-
yon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 928-31 (N.D. IMI. 1984) (Title VII and section 1981); Scott v. Oce
Indus., 536 F. Supp. 141, 148 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Title VII). But see Michaelis v. Polk Bros.,
Inc., 545 F. Supp. 109, 116-17 (N.D. Ill. 1982). On two occasions, the Seventh Circuit itself
has cited one of the leading cases for the reasonable person test with apparent approval. See
Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Bourque v. Powell
Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980)), cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 828 (1985); Brown v.
Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 365 (7th Cir. 1983) (same).
SSee Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985); Pena v. Brattleboro
Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1983).
17 See Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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gap by noting on occasion that both the employer's specific intent
and the foreseeability of the consequences of its actions are
relevant. 18
Despite these variations, the case-by-case application of the
reasonable person test has revealed a few basic principles. Most
significantly, courts have determined that, as a matter of law, an
isolated violation of an employment discrimination statute does
not create intolerable working conditions. 19 The Fifth Circuit ex-
plained in Bourque that "we believe that society and the policies
underlying Title VII will best be served if, whenever possible, un-
lawful employment discrimination is attacked within the context
of existing employment relationships. 2 0 As another court put it, if
the "mere fact of discrimination [were] sufficient grounds for the
wronged employee to resign and claim full back pay, an 'employee
would be encourage[d] to set himself up as the judge of every
grievance.' ,,21
Consequently, constructive discharge claims have been re-
jected in cases where the employee was simply denied a promotion
or given unequal pay. 2 Rather, courts have required evidence of an
"'aggravated situation' beyond 'ordinary discrimination.' "23 Such
a situation can be found to exist when the plaintiff was subjected
either to a number of instances of discriminatory treatment or to
'8 For example, in Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, (6th Cir. 1982), the court stated
that "the constructive discharge issue . . . requires an inquiry into the intent of the em-
ployer and the reasonably foreseeable impact of the employer's conduct upon the em-
ployee." Id. at 432. In Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1984), the court provided
this summary of Held:
This court recently concluded in [Held] that the validity of a constructive discharge
claim depends upon the facts of each case and requires an inquiry into the intent of the
employer and the reasonably foreseeable impact of the employer's conduct upon the
employee. Additionally, this court ruled that, "a finding of constructive discharge re-
quires the determination that... working conditions would have been so difficult that
a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign."
Id. at 522-23 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 929 (N.D. Ill. 1984); B. SCHLEi & P.
GROsSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAW 611-12 (1983).
:0 Bourque, 617 F.2d at 66.
21 Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 79 Civ. 1076-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1985)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago,
562 F.2d 114, 119 (st Cir. 1977)).
.2 See, e.g., Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077
(5th Cir. 1981); Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 1981); Bour-
que, 617 F.2d at 65.
" Bailey, 583 F. Supp. at 929 (quoting Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65-66); see, e.g., Clark v.
Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Garcia v. Forbes Magazine, No. 83 Civ.
3814-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); EEOC v.
Hay Assocs., 545 F. Supp. 1064, 1085-86 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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one particularly egregious instance of discrimination.24 For exam-
ple, aggravated circumstances have been found to exist when the
employee was subjected to continuing sexual harassment,25 as-
signed onerous job duties,26 or given a severe demotion and then
forced to work face to face with an alleged antagonist.27 Also, it is
relevant that the employee attempted unsuccessfully to seek re-
dress from the employer before resigning.28
2. The Specific Intent Test. The minority approach requires
the plaintiff to show not only that working conditions were so in-
tolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign,
but also that the employer created those conditions with the spe-
cific intent to cause the employee to resign.29 This approach was
first announced by the Tenth Circuit in Muller v. United States
Steel Corp.30 There the plaintiff worked in the employer's mill for
fourteen years, but was never considered for the promotion he re-
quested. He eventually filed discrimination charges with a state
agency, but "[n]o action was taken" and he resigned several
months later.s
The plaintiff, a Spanish-American, introduced statistics which
showed that Spanish-Americans had been given a disproportion-
ately low percentage of promotions. The employer made promo-
tions based on the ad hoc recommendations of supervisors. The
Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding that making promo-
tions by this method violated Title VII, but reversed a finding that
the plaintiff had been constructively discharged. The court noted
that there was a "dearth of evidence to show a deliberate effort to
make things difficult for the employee so as to bring about his
separation. 3 2
In support of this intent requirement, the court looked to
2" Bailey, 583 F. Supp. at 929-30.
2 See, e.g., Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520, 523 (6th Cir. 1984); Coley v. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 651 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
26 See, e.g., Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 49-50 (6th Cir. 1985);
Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1981).
27 See, e.g., Cazzola v. Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., 751 F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1984).
28 See, e.g., Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1174-76 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiff's "re-
peated but futile attempts to obtain relief" though informal means and formal administra-
tive channels constituted an aggravating factor, since she was "essentially locked into a posi-
tion from which she could apparently obtain no relief").
25 See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985).
30 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
31 Id. at 924-25.
" Id. at 929. The Tenth Circuit used the same approach in Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 454 (10th Cir. 1981) (Title VII) ("dearth of evidence" to show defendant
"engaged in a course of conduct designed to force" plaintiff to quit).
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cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act.33 Section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to fire an employee on the basis of union membership.3 4 In
the early NLRA cases employers wished to fire employees because
of their union activities, but wanted to limit their liability under
section 8(a)(3). Consequently, the employers made working condi-
tions intolerable in order to force employees to quit. For example,
employees were demoted,3 5 harassed,36 transferred to less desirable
jobs,3 7 or assigned more onerous job duties.38 Courts crafted the
constructive discharge concept to prevent an employer from "[do-
ing] constructively what the act prohibits his doing directly."3 9
From these cases the rule evolved that an employer construc-
tively discharges an employee when it "deliberately makes an em-
ployee's working conditions intolerable and thereby forces him to
quit his job because of union activities or union membership. '40
And some NLRA cases required not only that the employer have
intended the intolerable conditions, but also that it have intended
those conditions to result in resignation.41 Relying on this standard
:3 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982))
[hereinafter cited as the NLRA].
3 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). Discouraging membership in a union includes discour-
aging participation in concerted activities. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S.
26, 32 (1967); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1954). A constructive
discharge could also be based on NLRA § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1982), if an em-
ployer discriminated against an employee and caused her to quit because the employee filed
unfair labor practice charges or gave testimony under the Act. See NLRB v. Vacuum Plat-
ers, Inc., 374 F.2d 866, 867 (7th Cir. 1967).
35 See, e.g., NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. United States Air Conditioning Corp., 336 F.2d 275, 276 (6th Cir. 1964); In re
American Potash & Chem. Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. 140, 158-59 (1937), enforced, 98 F.2d 488 (9th
Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 643 (1939).
' See, e.g., NLRB v. Holly Bra, Inc., 405 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Ten-
nessee Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203, 204 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp.,
201 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir. 1953); In re Sterling Corset Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 858, 866-70 (1938).
37 See, e.g., In re Russell Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1085 (1949); In re Fellows, 75
N.L.R.B. 662, 669 (1947); In re Palm Beach Broadcasting Corp., 63 N.L.R.B. 597, 612-13
(1945).
8 See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494-95 (4th Cir. 1972).
NLRB v. Holly Bra, Inc., 405 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1969) (citation omitted).
J.P. Stevens & Co., 461 F.2d at 494; see Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 S. Ct. 2803,
2810 (1984) (constructive discharge occurs when, "for the purpose of discouraging union
activity, [the employer] purposefully creates working conditions so intolerable that the em-
ployee has no option but to resign"); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 452, 459
(6th Cir. 1967).
41 For example, in Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1976), the
NLRB announced the following test:
There are two elements which must be proven in order to establish a "constructive
discharge." First, the burdens imposed upon the employee must cause, and be intended
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from the NLRA cases, the Muller court denied backpay to a Title
VII claimant because no specific intent was demonstrated.42
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have also imported the
NLRA's intent requirement into constructive discharge under Ti-
tle VII, requiring the plaintiff to show that the employer intended
to force her to quit.43 But in spite of this requirement, these courts
have not insisted on "smoking gun" evidence of employer intent.
Rather, as the NLRA cases instruct,44 courts have accepted indi-
rect evidence, such as the employer's failure to change conditions
it knew were intolerable.4
5
to cause, a change in his working conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to
resign. Second, it must be shown that those burdens were imposed because of the em-
ployee's union activities.
Id. at 1069. In applying the test to the facts before it, the Board observed that "the record,
on balance, does not demonstrate that [the employer] wanted [the employee] to quit." Id.
Other NLRA cases have been less clear in their application of the intent test. In J.P.
Stevens & Co., for example, the court noted that the employer acted with "the purpose 'of
causing [the plaintiff] to resign,"' but announced a standard which focused not on whether
the employer intended the resignation, but rather whether the employer merely intended
the conditions leading to it. 461 F.2d at 494. For the implications of this ambiguity for Title
VII cases, see infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
"' Muller, 509 F.2d at 929.
43 Fourth Circuit: Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985)
(ADEA); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984) (Title VII), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1395 (1985); EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983)
(Title VII), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984).
Eighth Circuit: Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985) (Title
VII); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981) (Title VII and sec-
tion 1981); Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 F.2d 220, 223 (8th Cir. 1977) (Title
VII and section 1981).
44 In cases applying the NLRA courts have found a variety of sources of evidence rele-
vant to whether a constructive discharge has occurred. These include the employer's post
hoc explanation of its actions, testimony about what was said at the time of the actions in
dispute, and evidence about how other employees were treated. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co.
v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494-95 (4th Cir. 1972) (comparison between the employer's treat-
ment of plaintiff employee and other employees); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 339
F.2d 203, 204 (6th Cir. 1964) (testimony about derogatory statements made by supervisors);
Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1068, 1068-69 (1976) (Board evaluates reason-
ableness of supervisor's reasons for transferring plaintiff employee). Based on all the evi-
dence, the trier of fact decides whether, "on balance," the employer intended to force the
employee to resign. See, e.g., Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N.L.R.B. at 1069. Some
cases explain this inquiry in terms of whether the employer should have foreseen the resig-
nation, on the grounds that "[i]t is a well recognized rule in labor relations law that 'a man
is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct.'" Tennessee Packers, Inc.,
339 F.2d at 204-05 (quoting Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954)).
'" See, e.g., Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1395 (1985).
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B. Comparison of the Two Tests
The two principal tests for evaluating constructive discharge
claims under Title VII and the ADEA have very different orienta-
tions. The reasonable person test focuses on the effect of the em-
ployer's actions on the employee, asking whether working condi-
tions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have been
forced to quit. The specific intent test focuses instead on the em-
ployer, asking whether the employer made conditions intolerable
with the intent to force the employee to quit. In many cases, how-
ever, the two tests may lead to the same result. This part of the
comment identifies the kinds of cases where the tests will yield
similar results and those where the tests will yield different results.
1. The Overlap Between the Two Tests. The most funda-
mental source of overlap between the two tests stems from the fact
that under both tests the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reason-
able person would have found the working conditions intolerable.4 6
Thus if conditions are found to have been tolerable, the plaintiff's
claim will fail under either test. Courts which use the specific in-
tent test vary somewhat in their approach to this overlap. Some
courts distinguish between the two parts of the specific intent
test-intolerable conditions and intent-and hold that such a
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate objective intolerability."7 Other
courts tend to collapse the two parts into one, and hold that the
absence of intolerable conditions demonstrates that the employer
did not intend to force the employee to resign." For example, in
Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.,4 9 the plaintiff had claimed that the
"close monitoring and harsh treatment" that he received from his
supervisors formed the basis of a constructive discharge. However,
all the other employees received the same treatment, a fact that
the court said "rebutt[ed] any inference that [the employer's] han-
dling of [the plaintiff] was done with the intention of forcing him
to resign. Certainly [the employer] did not wish to force all of its
employees to resign."50
A different kind of overlap stems from the fact that if intolera-
46 See supra text accompanying notes 8, 29.
47 See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (4th Cir. 1985); Craft v.
Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985).
48 See, e.g., EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984); Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 454
(10th Cir. 1981).
49 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981).
50 Id. at 1256.
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ble conditions are found to exist, the existence of those conditions
can be highly probative evidence of the employer's subjective in-
tent. A good example is a Fourth Circuit case, Holsey v. Armour &
Co. 51 There the court upheld a finding that the employer had vio-
lated Title VII both by discriminating against seven black employ-
ees and by retaliating against them for having filed discrimination
charges.
One of these employees alleged constructive discharge. On
eight occasions he had been passed over for supervisory and sales
positions, which were given to less qualified and junior white em-
ployees. After the employee filed a discrimination charge, he was
given a supervisory position but denied equal status with white su-
pervisors. Thereafter he was "systematically harassed," his shift
was changed twice to accommodate white supervisors, and his au-
thority was undercut by the general foreman, who granted leave to
employees supervised by the plaintiff without advising him in ad-
vance. 52 Despite the plaintiff's complaints to the employer, the de-
grading treatment continued. These events led the court to con-
clude that "the company knew [he] was denied equal status as a
supervisor and was subjected to harassment but failed to correct
these practices." 53
The employer argued that the plaintiff had failed to show that
it had "acted with the intent to force the employee to resign."' In
response, the court acknowledged that evidence of the employer's
intent was required, but found circumstantial proof sufficient.
"The fact that higher officials knew of [the plaintiff's] untenable
position and took no action to correct it supports the district
court's finding that the employment conditions were 'imposed by
the company.' This finding satisfies the requirement of
deliberateness. '5 5
Thus the existence of intolerable conditions can be the critical
element in both of the principal tests for constructive discharge. In
many cases, this overlap minimizes the practical differences be-
tween the tests.56
1 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1395 (1985).
52 Id. at 209.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
6 The overlap between the tests can also be seen in Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr.
Co., 661 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981). When the plaintiff there informed her supervisor that she
was pregnant, she was promised maternity leave when she needed it. However, when the
plaintiff arrived at work one day several months later, she found a replacement sitting at
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2. Differences Between the Tests. Although the specific in-
tent and reasonable person tests may overlap substantially, they
are not identical. In many cases employees may be subjected to
intolerable conditions even though the employer does not intend to
force the employee to resign. In such cases, a court applying a spe-
cific intent test would not find a constructive discharge.
In Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.,5 7 for example, a television news-
person claimed that her employer had discriminated against her by
demoting her from anchorperson to reporter, and by applying un-
usually strict standards to her personal appearance. The Eighth
Circuit upheld the trial court's finding that those actions had not
violated Title VII and did not create intolerable working condi-
tions. But the court also observed that even if those actions had
made the plaintiff's working conditions intolerable, she would nev-
ertheless fail in her constructive discharge claim. The reason was
that the trial court had also found that the employer had not in-
tended to force the plaintiff to quit, but rather, had wanted her to
remain at work. 8 The specific intent and reasonable person tests
compel different results in such a case.
In Clark v. Marsh,5 9 the plaintiff sought various promotions
and lateral transfers through the Army's Career Program for Civil
her desk. She was then ordered by her supervisor to clear out her desk because she was
going to work in a warehouse with two men who performed heavy manual labor. When the
plaintiff responded that she could not perform such work without endangering her own
health and that of her unborn child, the supervisor merely "snickered" and indicated that
he did not care. Id. at 371. As a result, the plaintiff resigned.
Applying a reasonable person test, the Fifth Circuit upheld a finding that the circum-
stances were sufficiently aggravated to amount to a constructive discharge. Id. at 372. How-
ever, it is likely that a court applying a subjective intent test would have reached the same
result. Given the nature of the choice put to the plaintiff-resign, or run a risk of harming
her baby-it would seem almost impossible for the employer to rebut the inference that it
intended to force the plaintiff to quit.
A similar but somewhat more difficult case is Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770
F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1985), in which the Sixth Circuit upheld a finding that the plaintiff had
been constructively discharged because of her age in violation of the ADEA. The plaintiff
had been employed as a "benefits clerk," and resigned at the age of 52 after she was de-
moted to a mail clerk. In that job, she would have been required to ride a three-wheeled
cycle to deliver packages or boxes which sometimes weighed between fifty to eighty pounds.
Id. at 49-50. Although the Sixth Circuit appeared to apply a reasonable person test, a court
applying a subjective intent test could infer from the nature of the demotion that the em-
ployer intended to force the employee to resign.
57 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
" Id. at 1217; see also EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir.
1983) ("There is absolutely no evidence that the defendant sought by its action 'to force
[the plaintiff] to quit.' The evidence is quite clearly to the contrary. [The plaintiff's] super-
visor sought to persuade her not to quit.").
51 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Personnel Administration. Although she had an "outstanding" em-
ployment record, she received only one permanent promotion in
over a decade. She had made numerous informal efforts to have
her situation corrected and finally filed a formal administrative
complaint, but to no avail. She resigned after she was denied a
permanent promotion to the position of director of her office. She
had filled that position on an acting basis- and had received per-
formance ratings of "outstanding" and "satisfactory," but the job
was given to a younger woman with no supervisory experience."e
Applying a reasonable person test, the D.C. Circuit found that
these circumstances were "aggravating factors" indicating con-
structive discharge. 1
A court applying a specific intent test would have reached a
contrary result. The employer in Clark had introduced evi-
dence-which the appellate court dismissed as "irrelevant" under
a reasonable person test-that the plaintiff had in fact been "en-
couraged" not to resign. 2 Furthermore, the employer's actions re-
flected no consistent scheme: the promotional decisions were
spread out over a period of many years and made by a panel whose
composition probably changed during that time. 3 A court would
thus have difficulty concluding that the employer intended the
plaintiff to resign.
II. CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE TEST
No court has adequately justified its choice of either a reason-
able person or a specific intent test. Courts which adopt the spe-
cific intent test seem to do so primarily out of deference to the
NLRA cases. 4 To the extent that a justification has been offered
for adopting the reasonable person test, it is generally thiat the test
faithfully implements the policies of the statutes as well as other
policy objectives.6 5 That defense at least seems to identify the
60 Id. at 1174-75 & n.7.
6I Id. at 1175-76.
62 Id. at 1175 n.8.
Id. at 1170; see Clark v. Alexander, 489 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (D.D.C. 1980), afrd in
part & rev'd in part sub nom. Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" See, e.g., Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
65 See, e.g., Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1980). In
comparing the reasonable person test to the specific intent test, the court said only that the
latter is "inconsistent. . . with the realities of modern employment." Id. at 65. The court's
discussion of the policies served by the reasonable person test came in the context of the
plaintiff's claim that the mere fact that she had been subject to salary discrimination consti-
tuted a constructive discharge. Id. at 65-66; see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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proper inquiry: as with any issue arising under a statute, the start-
ing point for analysis should be the text and history of the statute.
This part of the comment undertakes that analysis, and concludes
that the reasonable person test best serves the purposes of Title
VII and the ADEA.
A. Title VII
Because the issue of whether a constructive discharge has oc-
curred arises only after a court has found that the actions alleged
to have caused the resignation violated Title VII, the relevant pro-
vision to be examined is section 706(g), which governs the use of
remedies in Title VII litigation. This section provides that once a
violation of Title VII has been established, "the court may . ..
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include. . . reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate." 86
Supreme Court cases that have considered the use of the
backpay remedy have set out arguments which, by implication,
favor adoption of the reasonable person test. In the leading case,
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court considered whether
black employees locked into low-paying jobs by a discriminatory
seniority system were presumptively entitled to backpay 8 The
Court began its analysis by conceding that, under the plain lan-
guage of section 706(g), backpay was an equitable remedy that
could be granted or withheld at the discretion of the court.6 How-
ever, in exercising that discretion, courts were to be guided by two
overarching purposes of Title VII: the "prophylactic" objective of
eradicating discrimination in employment, and the compensatory
objective of "mak[ing] persons whole for injuries suffered on ac-
count of unlawful employment discrimination. 7 0 The Court con-
cluded that "given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally,
would not frustrate [those] central statutory purposes. '7 1
In the context of constructive discharge, these purposes are
best served by a reasonable person standard. Albemarle under-
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
" Id. at 409.
Id. at 415-16.
o Id. at 417-18.
71 Id. at 421.
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stood Title VII to prevent more than merely intentional violations;
the backpay remedy "'provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes
employers . . to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employ-
ment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the
last vestiges'" of discrimination. 72 A specific intent test contra-
venes Congress's purpose by shielding employers from backpay lia-
bility despite working conditions that are intolerably discrimina-
tory in violation of Title VII.7 3
The reasonable person test is also the only approach that ade-
quately fulfills Congress's compensatory purpose. According to Al-
bemarle, Title VII contemplates that victims of discrimination will
be "made whole" by being compensated to the full extent of their
injury.7 4 This suggests that the inquiry most relevant to construc-
tive discharge should be the effect of the discriminatory conditions
on the employee regardless of the extent to which that effect was
intended. Only then will victims be made whole for intolerable and
illegal working conditions.
Moreover, the Court made it clear that the desirability of pre-
vention and compensation are unrelated to the employer's intent.
The Court rejected the argument that backpay should be awarded
only when the employer violated Title VII in "bad faith":
[I]f backpay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith,
the remedy would become a punishment for moral turpitude,
rather than a compensation for workers' injuries. This would
read the "make whole" purpose right out of Title VII, for a
worker's injury is no less real simply because his employer did
not inflict it in "bad faith." Title VII is not concerned with
the employer's "good intent or absence of discriminatory in-
tent" for "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the con-
sequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation.17 5
This reasoning seems equally persuasive in the context of con-
structive discharge. To paraphrase the Court, the injury suffered
7 Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir.
1973)).
73 Cf. 422 U.S. at 417 ("If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order,
they would have little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality.").
7" Id. at 418 ("'The general rule is, that when a wrong has been done, and the law gives
a remedy, the compensation shall be equal to the injury.' ") (quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)).
75 422 U.S. at 422 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)) (cita-
tions and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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by an employee who is subjected to intolerable discrimination "is
no less real" because the employer did not impose those conditions
with the purpose of forcing the employee to resign. Although the
Court in Albemarle suggested that the absence of bad faith may
"[open] the door to equity" for the employer,76 an employer that is
responsible for intolerable discrimination would seem to have a
weak claim on the Chancellor's conscience.
The reasonable person test is also consistent with the mitiga-
tion-of-damages provision in section 706(g) of Title VII. This pro-
vision reduces any backpay remedy by the amount of "[i]nterim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence. '77 The Su-
preme Court has applied this section to disallow backpay where,
for example, the employer has offered to reinstate an employee dis-
charged in violation of Title VII. 8 In reaching this holding, the
Court compared the new job offered to the employee to the posi-
tion held prior to the discharge. Since the new job was "substan-
tially equivalent" to the employee's former position, the employee
was entitled to no backpay after the offer was made.7 9
The circumstances surrounding mitigation of damages after
discharge are analogous to the circumstances surrounding the em-
ployee's decision to resign in a case of constructive discharge. In
both instances the question is whether the employee is entitled to
backpay in spite of the employer's willingness to continue the em-
ployment relationship. Under the statute, the relevant standard in
the mitigation case is one of reasonableness on the part of the em-
ployee. Likewise, when the issue is backpay for constructive dis-
charge, the proper focus should be the reasonableness of the em-
ployee's decision to resign. The reasonable person test, which
requires working conditions to be intolerable before the employee
may resign, ensures that this decision is a reasonable one.
Despite these arguments in favor of a reasonable person ap-
proach, there are at least two possible arguments for adopting a
specific intent test. The first argument underlies most decisions
adopting an intent approach and finds support in Albemarle's lan-
guage: since the backpay provision of Title VII was "expressly
modeled" on the NLRA,80 perhaps it was intended to adopt the
intent-based approach commonly used in the NLRA constructive
76 422 U.S. at 422.
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
7$ See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982).
79 Id. at 232.
60 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419-20.
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discharge cases as the standard for constructive discharge cases
under Title VII.1
This conclusion has several problems. At a basic level, it exag-
gerates the importance of the NLRA to the interpretation of Title
VII. The Court's "expressly modeled" assertion was based on the
following statement in the legislative history:
The relief [available in Title VII suits] would be an injunction
against future acts or practices of discrimination, but the
court could order appropriate affirmative relief, such as hiring
or reinstatement of employees and the payment of back pay.
This relief is similar to that available under the National La-
bor Relations Act ....
Given the vagueness of this reference to the NLRA, it is not sur-
prising that the Supreme Court has stated subsequently that
"[t]he principles developed under the NLRA generally guide, but
do not bind, courts in tailoring remedies under Title VII. ' 3
Furthermore, in Albemarle the Court's actual conclusion was
that "[w]e may assume that Congress was aware that the Board,
since its inception, has awarded backpay as a matter of course.""
While it may be plausible to argue that Congress "was aware" of a
Board practice with such wide implications, it is far less likely that
Congress was aware of the Board's practice with respect to the
comparatively narrow question of constructive discharge.
Moreover, it is far from clear that the NLRA cases support a
specific intent test. Although the NLRA cases enunciated a test
which focused on the employer's intent, this was most likely be-
cause the employers in anti-union campaigns invariably had the
intent to make working conditions intolerable or to force the resig-
nation of union sympathizers.8 5 In other words, the courts were not
faced with cases like those that sometimes arise under Title VII or
the ADEA, in which employers, by their discriminatory acts, create
intolerable working conditions without intending to force their em-
ployees to resign. If the courts had faced such cases under the
NLRA, they might well have elected to ignore the employer's in-
tent and apply the reasonable person test, for the NLRA backpay
81 See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
*' 110 CONG. REC. 7214 (1964) (interpretive memorandum introduced by Senators Clark
and Case), cited in Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419 n.11. The Court also cited a similar comment
made by Senator Humphrey. See 422 U.S. at 419 n.11 (citing 110 CoNG. REc. 6549 (1964)).
"' Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 226 n.8.
8 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419-20.
85 See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972).
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provision, like those of Title VII and the ADEA, is designed to
"make whole" the employee."6 Thus, the Title VII cases should be
considered independent from the NLRA cases.
The second argument favoring the specific intent test is found
in Title VII itself. Section 706 establishes a procedure designed to
give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission an opportu-
nity to resolve employment discrimination disputes "by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. '87 That proce-
dure reflects a strong congressional preference for the voluntary
resolution of employment discrimination disputes.8 It could be ar-
gued that a voluntary settlement is more likely to occur if the em-
ployee attempts to oppose the unlawful employment practice while
remaining on the job, rather than poisoning the situation further
by resigning.8 9 This view is buttressed by section 704(a), which
makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to re-
taliate against an employee because the employee has "opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub-
chapter, or because he has made a charge [against the
employer]." 90
However, the reasonable person test is flexible enough to ac-
commodate the objective of private reconciliation. One of the fac-
tors which is commonly considered in applying the test is whether
the employee gave the employer an opportunity to correct the al-
leged wrong before the employee quit.9 1 In some cases it might be
considered essential that the employee give the employer that op-
portunity; in others, it might be clear that such an effort would be
futile. As long as those factors are given careful consideration by
the trier of fact, the reasonable person test is fully consistent with
the policies behind sections 704(a) and 706.
s' See NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969); Nathanson v.
NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
87 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Comment, Col-
lateral Attacks on Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. CHL L. Rxv. 147,
168-69 (1986).
9 See Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Thornberry, J., dissenting); see also Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th
Cir. 1980).
90 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982); see Note, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Dis-
charge in Title VII Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. Rnv. 587, 616 (1986).
" See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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B. The ADEA
Similar arguments can be advanced for adopting a reasonable
person test under the ADEA. In drafting the ADEA, Congress
drew heavily upon Title VII. The ADEA's substantive prohibitions
against age discrimination are patterned after those of Title VII,
and include a prohibition on retaliation similar to section 704(a) of
Title VII.92 In addition, both the ADEA and Title VII contain pro-
cedural requirements aimed at facilitating the informal resolution
of employment discrimination disputes.13 Most important, the
dominant policy objectives of the ADEA are parallel to those of
Title VII: a prophylactic objective of eliminating particular forms
of discrimination, and a compensatory objective of providing
make-whole relief to the victims of such discrimination.94
Indeed, for the purposes of this comment, the only relevant
difference between the two statutes centers on section 7(b) of the
ADEA,9 5 which governs the use of remedies. In drafting section
7(b), Congress drew not upon Title VII, but upon the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).98 Under section 7(b), a violation of the
ADEA is "deemed" to be a violation of the FLSA, and "[a]mounts
owing to a person as a result of a violation ... shall be deemed to
be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for
purposes of [the FLSA]. ' ' 7 Although Congress made some modifi-
cations, on the whole the ADEA's remedial provisions "essentially
follow those of the [FLSA]." 98
This remedial scheme of the ADEA differs in two ways from
that of Title VII, with both differences favoring the adoption of a
reasonable person test. First, "the ADEA incorporates the FLSA
provision that employers 'shall be liable' for [backpay], while
92 See supra note 1. The Supreme Court has observed, "the prohibitions of the ADEA
were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
93 Compare Title VII § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982), with ADEA § 7(d), 29
U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982). The pro-settlement policy of Title VII is discussed supra at notes 87-
88 and accompanying text. For -a discussion of the parallel policy in the ADEA, see H.R.
REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2213, 2218 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
9 See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1237 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
913 (1978); see also Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.
95 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982))
[hereinafter cited as the FLSA]; see Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 578-85; Note, Set-Offs Against
Back Pay Awards Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 79 McH. L.
REv. 1113, 1113 (1981).
97 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
8 HouSE REPORT, supra note 93, at 5, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 2218.
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under Title VII, the availability of backpay is a matter of equitable
discretion." ' Although a court's discretion to deny backpay under
Title VII is quite limited,100 the difference between the two stat-
utes implies that Congress was somewhat more solicitous of plain-
tiffs in ADEA cases. 101 Second, the ADEA does not contain any
provision analogous to Title VII's requirement that "[i]nterim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence" be de-
ducted from the plaintiff's backpay award. 10 2 To the extent that
this omission means anything at all, it again suggests that Congress
was even more generous toward plaintiffs under the ADEA than it
was under Title VII.103
In sum, the argument for adopting a reasonable person test is,
"9 Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.
100 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
101 Cf. McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 216-17 (3d Cir. 1984) (the reasons
supporting this court's doctrine concerning Title VII... apply ever more so to this case
involving the ADEA"), vacated & remanded, 105 S. Ct. 1159 (1985).
10' Title VII § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). The Supreme Court has character-
ized the duty to mitigate found in Title VII as a duty "rooted in [the] ancient principle of
law... to use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment." Ford Motor Co.
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982).
1O This absence of an express duty to mitigate damages has several possible explana-
tions. Congress may have simply failed to consider the issue. Cf. Note, supra note 96, at
1118 ("The more reasonable conclusion is that Congress simply did not consider the prob-
lem."). If so, the issue of mitigation would presumably be resolved by referring to the twin
purposes of the ADEA, as well as more general policy and equitable considerations. Cf. Rod-
riguez, 569 F.2d at 1243 (considering the question of offsets in light of the ADEA's "make-
whole relief objective"). That inquiry would seem to lead to the conclusion that the duty
should be similar to that required under Title VII. See Coates v. National Cash Register
Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 662 (W.D. Va. 1977) (although the ADEA does not expressly require
mitigation, "there seems to be no reason" for applying a different duty under the ADEA
than under Title VII).
Alternatively, Congress may have assumed that common law principles of mitigation
would apply. Cf. Note, supra note 96, at 1118. Although the FLSA did not expressly address
the issues of mitigation and setoff, some courts had required setoffs in FLSA cases, appar-
ently drawing on common law principles. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dyess, 180 F. Supp. 852, 854
(S.D. Ala. 1960). Congress may have assumed that courts would similarly apply common law
principles under the ADEA. If so, the plaintiff's duty to mitigate under the ADEA would
again be similar if not identical to that under Title VII.
Finally, Congress may have intended to reduce or eliminate the duty to mitigate. Cf.
Note, supra note 96, at 1118 ("Because the ADEA does not explicitly provide for set-offs,
plaintiffs can argue that Congress did not intend to limit awards to net loss."). This view
derives implicit support from repeated expressions of congressional concern about the diffi-
culties faced by older workers in finding new work after they have lost their jobs. See, e.g.,
113 CONG. REc. 34,744 (1967) (statement of Rep. Pucinski); 113 CONG. REC. 34,751 (1967)
(statement of Rep. Dwyer). This would suggest that Congress was even more generous to-
ward plaintiffs under the ADEA than it was under Title VII.
It should be noted that the issue of constructive discharge under the FLSA apparently
was not considered until quite recently, the court in that case applied a reasonable person
test. See Ford v. Alfaro, Nos. 85-1615, 85-1825, slip op. at 12-14 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 1986).
The University of Chicago Law Review
if anything, stronger under the ADEA than under Title VII. The
landscape of the debate is essentially the same under the two stat-
utes, with the exception of the remedial schemes. To the extent
that any real differences exist between those schemes, they suggest
that Congress was more solicitous of plaintiffs in ADEA cases. If
so, then the reasonable person test, which does not place the addi-
tional and unnecessary burden on the employee of having to prove
an employer's specific intent, is even more consistent with the pur-
poses of the ADEA than it is with Title VII.
CONCLUSION
Difficult remedial issues arise when employees resign from
their jobs after being subjected to conditions that violate Title VII
or the ADEA. All courts agree that such employees cannot recover
backpay for the period after they quit unless a reasonable person
would have found those conditions to be intolerable. However,
some courts also require a showing that the employer imposed
those conditions with specific intent to force the plaintiff to resign.
In drafting Title VII and the ADEA, Congress manifested two
overarching purposes: the prophylactic objective of eliminating dis-
crimination from the workplace, and the compensatory objective of
providing make-whole relief to victims of discrimination. The rea-
sonable person test serves both of those objectives better than does
the specific intent test. Furthermore, the reasonable person test is
wholly consistent with subsidiary congressional purposes, such as
fostering the informal resolution of employment disputes.
Sheila Finnegan
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